In this paper, we investigate two …scal policy options to mitigate …scal pressure arising from an ageing of Australian population: pension cuts or tax hikes. Using a computable overlapping generations model, we …nd that while the two policy options achieve the same …scal goal, the macroeconomic and welfare outcomes di¤er signi…cantly. Future generations prefer pension cuts, whereas current generations prefer tax hikes to …nance age-related government spending commitments. Interestingly, taxing consumption or income results in opposing e¤ects on macroeconomic aggregates and we ‡are across di¤erent skill types of households. Increases in the consumption tax rate have positive e¤ects on labour supply, domestic assets and output per capita (similarly to pension cuts), but reduce the welfare of low income households most. Conversely, increases in progressive income or payroll taxes have negative e¤ects on most macroeconomic aggregates but reduce the welfare of low income households least. Our results highlight the intra-and inter-generational con‡icts of interest and political constraints when implementing any structural …scal reforms.
Introduction
Developed countries around the world are experiencing ageing of their populations arising from changes in fertility and mortality. In Australia, population ageing will accelerate in the next few decades, driven partly by falling fertility rates in the past and partly by projected mortality improvements in the future. Although almost all developed countries need to deal with similar …scal issues associated with ageing demographics, problems facing Australia are quite di¤erent. The Australian population will increase signi…cantly in size due mainly to high net migration in ‡ows. Ageing while growing fast due to migration is a distinct feature of the demographic trend in Australia in next 50 years.
Such changes in the size and age structure of Australia's population will place increasing demands on the government in terms of …nancing old-age related spending on health, aged care and pensions. Fiscal reform will inevitably form part of the overall policy response to demographic change, but formulating an optimal policy response requires a rigorous economic analysis of how much adjustment is needed and what will be the consequences. Understanding the consequences of …scal reforms in the special context of the Australian economy will also give an insight into policy analyses of other ageing economies that plan reliance on migration to mitigate the adverse e¤ects of ageing. The main purpose of this paper is to quantify the macroeconomic and distributional welfare e¤ects of two …scal adjustments to mitigate …scal pressure arising from population ageing in Australia -pension cuts and tax hikes.
To that end, we construct a small open economy version of computable, overlapping generations (OLG) models based on Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) with non-stationary demographic structures. This class of models has been used by many researchers worldwide to analyse the economic e¤ects of population ageing (see, for example, Fehr (2000) , Nishiyama (2004) , Kotliko¤ et al. (2007) and Fehr et al., 2008) . Speci…cally, our model consists of overlapping households and the production, government and foreign sectors. Since rising …scal costs are due not only to pensions but also to health and aged care funded by the government, our model embodies a rich …scal structure with age-related public expenditures on health care, aged care, the means tested age pension as well as on education and family bene…ts. In addition, we use a demographic model to account for future developments in the age structure and the size of Australia's population.
We discipline our benchmark economy to match key Australian macroeconomic aggregates and demographic structure in 2012 and to approximate the lifecycle behavior of Australian households, including labour supply and earnings and pension payments. The model is then applied to conduct policy experiments.
First, using the demographic projections derived from our demographic model, we quantify the …scal costs of demographic transition. Note that we maintain our assumptions about the policy environment to focus on endogenous responses of households, …rms and the government to the exogenously-presumed changes in the demographic structure of the population. Our simulation results indicate that demographic shift in Australia with increasing (decreasing) population shares of the elderly (working cohorts) has signi…cant implications for the future government budget position through changes in both taxation revenues and expenditures. Similarly to Kudrna et al. (2013) , we …nd (i) signi…cant changes in the tax base with a shift from labour income to assets income and consumption and (ii) substantial increases in age-related spending on health care, aged care and the age pension, with a resulting …scal gap of over 2.5 percentage points of GDP in 2050, increasing to over 4.5 percentage points of GDP by 2100.
Next, we examine the macroeconomic and welfare e¤ects of the following two …scal reform options to respond to demographic shift: (i) a cut to government spending by reducing pension bene…ts and (ii) an increase in taxation revenues through adjusting either consumption or progressive income or payroll taxes. We …nd that while the two …scal reform options achieve the same goal of reducing the …scal burden of population ageing, their macroeconomic and welfare outcomes di¤er greatly. In terms of the welfare e¤ects, we …nd that young and future generations prefer pension cuts, but currently older and middle-age generations prefer to …nance the …scal burden though tax hikes. Furthermore, higher income households would prefer pension cuts as the age pension is not an important source of retirement income for them, whereas lower income types would prefer tax hikes with increases in progressive income tax rates. Interestingly, the indirect and regressive consumption tax hikes have opposing e¤ects on macroeconomic aggregates and welfare across skill types to those obtained from the income tax hikes. We show that the required increases in the consumption tax rate result in positive e¤ects on per capita labour supply, assets and output, but reduce the welfare of low income households most. Conversely, the increases in progressive income or payroll taxes result in negative e¤ects on output but reduce the welfare of poor households least.
Finally, we analyse the consequences of a mix of pension cuts and tax hikes. Given that the examined pension cuts alone only partially reduce the …scal pressure, we allow either the consumption or payroll tax rates to adjust to close the …scal gap. The results for these two experiments indicate that each tax rate initially declines due to pension cuts, but this is shown to reverse after 2030, with the payroll tax in particular rising signi…cantly to fund the increases in age-related spending. Similarly to the e¤ects of tax hikes alone, pension cuts combined with adjustments in consumption (payroll) taxes have positive (negative) long run e¤ects on the economy. Furthermore, welfare losses to future generations from increased payroll taxes are more than double of those resulting from consumption tax adjustments. The comparison of these two experiments indicates that the mix of pension cuts and labor income tax hike has some advantages by 2030. However, the mix of pension cuts and consumption tax hikes is a dominant policy option beyond 2030.
Our analysis has important policy implications. In all experiments, we …nd that each of the …scal reforms to respond to population ageing generally yield welfare reductions that vary greatly across household types and generations. We learn that the costs of population ageing are inevitable but also that the transitional costs on the aggregate economy and household welfare can be minimized by the choice of the …scal reform option. It appears that the reforms that allow individuals to have enough time to adjust and those that minimizes the …scal distortion on labor supply are the better policy options. However, the dominating welfare losses of the current retiring and working generations implies political di¢ culties for the implementation of structural …scal reforms in short run.
Related literature. Our paper is related to a growing literature that calculates …scal costs of population ageing and examines the implications of …scal reforms to mitigate these costs. 1 Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2006) build a multi-region model of the world focusing on the e¤ects of demographic trends across regions. Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2009) study the e¤ects of social security reforms in the U.S. with ageing demographics. Diaz-Gimenez and Diaz-Saavedra (2009) simulate a reform to raise the retirement age, using a model calibrated to the Spanish economy. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2013) , using a standard representative agent growth model, calculate the size of the Japanese …scal burden, which they de…ne as additional taxes required to maintain the promised levels of per capita public pensions and health services. Imrohoroglu et al. (2013) build a model based on micro-data to estimate the …scal costs of population ageing in Japan. Kitao (2014) uses a computable OLG model to examine the e¤ects of four pension reform options to achieve a …scal balance for the U.S. social security system. We follow a similar approach, but build a dynamic, general equilibrium OLG model with a detailed description of …scal policy to estimate …scal costs of population ageing in Australia. We also consider a broader plan for …scal reforms, allowing the government to adjust not only pension bene…ts but also taxes to …nance the …scal de…cit caused by population ageing. By comparing the implications of these two …scal reform options, we highlight that they result in di¤erent macroeconomic and welfare outcomes. Braun and Joines (2014) and Kitao (2015) use a similar approach to analyse the …scal cost of population ageing in Japan, while Nishiyama (2013) analyzes ageing in the U.S. It is important to notice that the populating ageing problems facing Australia are quite di¤erent from Japan and other advanced economies. That is, net migration in ‡ows to Australia are relatively high, so that the size of the Australian population will double while ageing is accelerated. In contrast, Japan's population is declining. Moreover, Australia's …scal setting is di¤erent, with its means-tested age pension and limited payroll taxes. Understanding the consequences of population ageing in that special Australian context will have important implications for policy analysis of other ageing economies that plan reliance on their migration policies to mitigate the …scal costs of ageing.
We also contribute directly to the literature on the economic and …scal implications of population ageing in Australia. The Australian Government (2010 Government ( , 2015 and Productivity Commission (2013) also quantify the …scal challenges caused by demographic shift. However, neither of these reports in their projections take direct account of behavioural responses to population ageing, which are an important component of our methodology. In addition, the 2015 Intergenerational Report (Australian Government, 2015) , which includes the e¤ects of the proposed policy changes on the government budget, provides little guidance for who bears the costs of these policy changes. The analyses of population ageing by Guest and McDonald (2001, 2002) and Guest (2006) uses a Ramsey model of optimal savings with no inter-generational heterogeneity among households. Kulish et al. (2010) apply an OLG model to study the macroeconomic e¤ects of changes in fertility and longevity, but they do not analyse the …scal e¤ects of demographic change. While …scal e¤ects are analysed by Kudrna et al. (2013) , using a small open economy OLG model with a government sector, they abstract from the policy reforms required to …nance the budgetary costs arising from population ageing, which are the focus of our paper.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we set up a dynamic, general equilibrium model. Section 3 provides details on the calibration of our model to the Australian economy, while Section 4 contains the discussion on the e¤ects of demographic transition. In Section 5, we examine a range of policy experiments to mitigate the …scal costs of population ageing, with the results presented in terms of macroeconomic and welfare implications. Section 6 o¤ers some conclusions and the Appendix describes the computational method.
Model
In this section, we formulate a small open economy OLG model. It is a general equilibrium model that comprises overlapping generations of heterogeneous households, a perfectly competitive representative …rm, and a government sector with essentials of the Australian tax and pension policy settings.
Demographics
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of households. In every time period t, there are 101 generations aged 0 to 100 years (j = 0; ::; J = 100). We assume that only adult households aged 21 years and over make economic decisions. Denoting N j;t as the size of a cohort of age j in time t; the total population is a sum of all cohorts alive in period t as P t = P J j=0 N j;t : The cohort share of the entire population at any point in time t is given by j;t = N j;t Pt : The population dynamics depend on the evolution of age-speci…c fertility, mortality and net immigration rates. The assumptions for these vital rates and the constructed demographic scenarios are discussed in detail in the next section on calibration.
Endowments
Agents are born with a speci…c skill (or income) type that determines their labor productivity over the lifecycle. Let i denote an individual's skill type and let there be I types of skill. The skill type is predetermined and unchanged over the life span. Let i be a measure of each skill type.
In each period of life, agents are endowed with 1 unit of time that has labor e¢ -ciency (or working ability) denoted by e i j : Note that the e¢ ciency unit e i j is skill-and age-dependent but time-invariant. According to this speci…cation, agents have working abilities that change over their lifecycle. The quantity of agent's e¤ective labor is The skill (income) types of households also di¤er by pre-determined family bene…ts, f b i j;t ; which are higher for lower income types of households compared to higher income types.
Preferences
All agents have identical lifetime preferences over consumption, c i j;t 0; and leisure, l i j;t , where leisure time is constrained by 0 l i j;t 1: Preferences are given by the expected inter-temporal utility function, which for generation j of skill type i who begins economic life at date t is expressed as
where the subscript s is de…ned as s = j + t 21; is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, is a constant discount factor and the term S j;s denotes unconditional age-dependent survival rates.
Technology
The production sector consists of a large number of perfectly competitive …rms, which is formally equivalent to one aggregate representative producer that maximises pro…ts. The production technology of this …rm is given by a constant returns to scale production function
where K t is the input of capital, L t is the input of e¤ective labor services (human capital) and A is the total factor productivity, which we assume to be constant. Capital formation is subject to the adjustment costs (see the next section for details).
Government
Mandatory retirement savings. The Australian pre-funded private pension scheme, which is stipulated by the government, is called the Superannuation Guarantee. It mandates employers to make contributions into employees'superannuation accounts. Accordingly, the representative producer in our model is required to pay these contributions for working households at the after-tax contribution rate, (1 s ) cr, from their gross labour income, w t e i j (1 l i j;t ), into the superannuation fund. The contributions are added to superannuation assets, sa i j;t ; which earn investment income at the after-tax interest rate, (1 r ) r t . The superannuation assets accumulation during j J sa can be expressed as
where r is the earnings tax rate, s denotes the contribution tax rate, cr is the mandatory contribution rate, r t is the domestic interest rate and w t is the market wage rate. The stock of superannuation assets accumulates in the fund until age J sa , when the accumulation ceases and households receive lump-sum payouts, expressed as
We further assume that working households aged j > J sa are paid mandatory contributions directly into their private assets account, denoted by sp i j>Jsa;t in household's budget constraint.
Means-tested public pension. The Australian pension system consists of some distinct features: (i) the pension bene…ts are means-tested and only a fraction of the low income retiree population receives pension bene…ts; (ii) the age pension system payment form part of the annual government budget expenditure, so that there is no social security tax to collect revenue collected from the current working population. That is, the age pension is non-contributory and funded through general tax revenues and means tested.
The government pays the age pension to households from age J ap , with the amount of pension bene…ts being subjected to the income test. Let ap i j;t denote the age pension bene…t, which is de…ned by 
where P max is the legislated single rate of the maximum age pension, is the income taper rate, IT denotes the income threshold and the assessable income is given by b y i j;t , which includes interest income and half of labour earnings. Note that the means-tested age pension is a component of social transfer payments (T R t ), included in the overall government budget that we describe next.
Fiscal policy. The government collects consumption and income (progressive income, superannuation and payroll) taxes from individuals and corporate taxes from …rms, T ax t ; in order to …nance government …nal consumption expenditures, G t , interest and principal payments on its debt, (1 + r t ) D t ; and government transfer payments to households T R t :
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The government also issues new debt, D t+1 ; to …nance …scal de…cits. The government budget constraint is given by
Foreign sector
We employ a small open economy speci…cation as this description …ts best the Australian economy. Hence, the domestic interest rate is exogenous and equal to the world interest rate, r t = r. When domestic savings fall short of the value of domestic capital, foreign capital will be employed, which adds to foreign debt. Denoting the net foreign debt as F D t at the beginning of period t, the international budget constraint can be expressed as
where the left-hand side of (6) represents capital ‡ows and the right-hand side gives the current account comprising the trade balance, T B t ; and the interest payments on net foreign debt, rF D t .
Household' s problem
The household's problem is to choose a sequence of consumption and leisure quantities to maximise the expected lifetime utility given by 
1=
# subject to a lifetime budget constraint that can be expressed as period by period asset accumulations
The left hand side of (7) includes the asset holdings at the end of age j, a a payroll tax at the rate of l and a progressive income tax from their taxable income, y i j;t , that comprises labour earnings, interest income and the age pension. The labour supply is required to be non-negative, 1 l i j;t 0; which implies that leisure, l j;t ; cannot exceed available time endowment, which is normalised to one. Note that when l i j;t = 1, the household does not work.
Firm' s problem
The producer maximises the present value of all future pro…t payments discounted at the world interest rate, r; subject to the capital accumulation equation, as described by
where f t denotes the e¤ective corporation tax rate, is the capital depreciation rate and C(I t ; K t ) represents adjustment costs, which are assumed to be quadratic in net investment, I t :
The …rst-order necessary conditions from the pro…t maximisation problem (8) may be solved for the producer's inter-temporal demands for labour, capital and investment and the Lagrange multiplier, q t ; (also representing the market price for capital), given the time pro…le for wage rate, w t ; and the interest rate, r:
Competitive equilibrium
Given government policy settings for the taxation and pension systems, the demographic structure and the world interest rate, a steady state competitive equilibrium is such that (a) households make optimal decisions ffc j;t ; l j;t ; a j;t g (c) the current account is balanced and foreign debt, F D t , is freely adjusted so that r t = r w , where r w is the world interest rate;
(d) the labour, capital and goods markets clear
where i gives intra-generational shares and N j;t is the size of cohort age j at time t.
(e) the government budget constraint (5) is satis…ed.
(f) the skill-speci…c bequest transfer is equal to the total amount of assets within each skill type left by the deceased agents, B i t = P j2J d j;t a i j;t j;t ; where the term d j;t denotes the age-speci…c mortality rates and j;t denotes the cohort shares. 3 
Calibration
We start our calculations by computing the benchmark economy that targets key Australian macroeconomic data averaged over 5 year period ending in June 2012. Hence, the year 2012 is assumed to be the base year for our economic calculations. While some model parameters are calibrated, other parameters are either taken from related literature or match actual policy settings in 2012. Demographics and values assigned to the model parameters that are reported in Table 1 are discussed in detail below.
Utility function
Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 
Demographics
The population dynamics in our model are driven by the sex-speci…c and age-dependent fertility, mortality and immigration rates. Even though we do not formally distinguish between sexes, we model the in ‡uences of sex-related factors on the dynamics of population ageing. That is, we assume that a cohort of age j in time t consists of male individuals N m j;t and female individuals N f j;t , so that
The size of each gender-speci…c cohort evolves over time. In each year t, the number of persons of gender g (g = m; f ) at age j; N g j;t ; is recursively given by
where the term 1 d g j;t N g j 1;t 1 denotes the last year's survivors, d g j;t is the sex-speci…c mortality rate and M g j;t denotes the number of net immigrants at age j in year t. The number of newborn males and females, N g 0;t ; is a function of age-speci…c fertility rates f j;t of females aged between 15 and 49 years in year t; with the terms ! m and ! f de…ning the birth shares of male and female newborns. 4 The assumptions for the three age-speci…c demographic rates are taken from the Productivity Commission's (2013) medium population projection scenario. Figure 1 shows these age-speci…c rates in 2012 (actual rates) and in a future year from which the given vital rates are assumed to remain constant. The Productivity Commission (2013) further assumes (i) the total fertility rate (sum of the age-speci…c fertility rates, f j;t ) to decrease from 1.89 in 2012 to 1.85 babies per woman by 2027; (ii) annual net immigration (sum of age-speci…c net immigration, M j;t ) to decline from 236,700 people in 2012 to 180,000 people by 2018; and (iii) the constant decline in mortality rates to generate life expectancy at birth that increases from 80 years in 2012 to 89.1 years by 2060 for males and from 84 years in 2012 to 91.4 years by 2060 for females. Since our economic framework does not distinguish between sexes, we use average mortality rates between males and females in the utility function to determine e¤ective rates of discount and also to calculate accidental bequests. The intra-generational cohorts shares, i ; are set to 0.2 for each skill or income type, based on the quintiles used by ABS (2012a).
Endowments
The time endowment that households allocate between leisure and labour supply is normalised to one. Households are also endowed with the e¢ ciency or earnings ability, e i j , that is age-and skill-dependent. We consider …ve skill or income types of households (i.e., the lowest, second, third, fourth and highest quintiles). The age-and skill-speci…c earnings ability, which is the age pro…le of the full wage earned with all time endowment allocated to work, is based on the econometric estimates of the lifetime wage function for males with 12 years of schooling by Reilly et al. (2005) . Using their estimates and ABS (2012a) data to derive income distribution shift parameters, we construct the lifecycle pro…les of e¢ ciency units for each skill type to approximately replicate the private income distribution in Australia. 5 The …ve skill types are also distinguished by their exogenously given social transfer payments (excluding the age pension). These pre-determined payments from the government allow us to also match social welfare and gross total income for each income quintile, and are discussed in more detail in the subsection on government parameterisation.
Preferences
Our choices of the annual utility and of the parameter values are standard in the related literature. The per-period utility function takes the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form
where the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution, ; is set to 0.9 and the value for the leisure distribution parameter, ; is 1.5, as in Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987) . The remaining parameters in the lifetime utility (1) are the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, = 0:35; and the subjective discount factor, = 0:98, whose value is set to generate the capital output ratio 
Technology
The technology is described by the CES production function
where the technology constant, = 0:88; is calibrated to reproduce the market wage rate, w, which is normalised to one in 2012. The elasticity of substitution in production, = 0:87; and the capital intensity parameter, " = 0:45; are calibrated via the producer's …rst order conditions to match the interest rate and national account data for factor shares. The capital stock depreciates at rate = 0:07; which is set to target the investment rate I K of 0.09 (ABS, 2012b). Following Fehr et al. (2008) , the adjustment cost function is assumed to be quadratic in net investment and given by
with the adjustment cost parameter, = 2:27; calibrated such that the adjustment costs account for about 10 percent of investment in 2012. 6 
Government
Tax revenues. The government total tax revenue, T ax t ; consists of tax revenues from taxing household taxable income, T ax Y t ; and consumption, T ax T ax
T ax
The statutory rates for the consumption, payroll, corporation and superannuation taxes are reported in Table 1 . The income taxes (imposed on taxable income consisting of labour earnings net of the payroll tax, investment income and the age pension) are progressive and we use a di¤erentiable approximation function of the 2010-11 Australian personal income tax schedule. 7 Age-speci…c government expenditures. The average age-speci…c public expenditures on health care, hc j ; aged care, ac j ; education, edu j ; and family bene…ts, F B j ; which are exogenous in our model, are plotted in Figure 2 . Note that the age-pro…les of public health care, aged care and education expenditures are taken from Productivity Commission (2013), while the age-pro…le of family bene…ts is derived from the 2010 HILDA survey. As mentioned, family bene…ts are further disaggregated so that they also di¤er across the …ve household types, f b
The parameter, i ; is calculated to match the share of social welfare in gross total income for each income quintile in 2012 (ABS, 2012a). Government consumption. The …nal government consumption, G t ; consists of expenditures on education, health care, aged care and government purchases of other goods and services. The government purchases of other goods and services are nonage related expenditures that are expressed in per capita terms and denoted as G t : The government's …nal consumption expenditures can be expressed as
Note that the average age-speci…c expenditures on education, edu j ; (which are spent on children aged 0 to 20 years), health care , hc j ; and aged care, ac j , are assumed to be constant over time.
Government transfers. There are two government transfer programs: age pension payments and family bene…ts. The age pension payments, ap i j;t , are endogenous in the model and are received only by eligible households aged 65 years and over that satisfy the means test. The values for the age pension parameters (i.e., the maximum pension rate, P max , the income threshold, IT; and the income taper rate, ) and for the superannuation parameters (i.e., mandatory contribution rate, cr, contribution and fund's investment tax rates, s and r ) match the actual values in 2012. The age-and time-speci…c family bene…ts, f b i j;t , are assumed to be exogenous and received by households between ages 21 and 60 years. 8 The total transfer payments are
Adjustments parameters. We match the exact sizes of government items expressed in percent of GDP in 2012 by using adjustment parameters for each of government expenditures and for each of tax revenues. We calculate these parameters to match the composition of government spending based on the data from ABS (2013a, 2013b). Table   2 reports the values of these calibrated parameters together with the calibrated targets. Note that the optimisation problems faced by households and …rms and the government budget constraint with all the tax revenues and expenditures described algebraically above would need to be adjusted so that each tax rate and transfer payment are multiplied by the corresponding adjustment parameter. For example, given the pension adjustment parameter is 0.89, the pension bene…ts, ap i j;t ; in (14) and in the household's budget constraint (7) are scaled down for each income quintile, re ‡ecting the use of the maximum pension for single pensioners (whereas a lower pension is paid to many couples in Australia). 9 Finally, we assume a balanced government budget with no government debt, that is, D(t) = rD(t) = 0 in Equation (5) . Although the consolidated Australian government budget was in a de…cit of about 3 percent of GDP in 2012 and net government debt was 10.6 percent of GDP in the same year, the Australian government is committed to balanced budgets in the future.
Foreign sector
The small open economy framework that we use implies that the domestic interest rate is exogenous and equal to the world interest rate. The world interest rate, r w , is assumed to be 5 percent. We also set the equilibrium condition for the capital market such that 81 percent of the domestic capital stock come from household savings, with the remaining 19 percent funded through net foreign debt. This re ‡ects the net foreign ownership of about 19 percent of Australia's capital stock (i.e., 
Benchmark solution and performance
The benchmark solution is obtained by numerically solving the model for the arti…cial steady state (as in Fehr, 2000) , using the parameters and the policy settings speci…ed earlier. In this subsection, we report the benchmark solution for the base year of 2012 and provide a comparison with the actual data at both the household and aggregate levels. The computational technique and the software used to solve for the base year and the demographic transitions are discussed in the Appendix. 9 The progressive income tax is also scaled down, as the model does not account for any tax o¤sets available mainly for lower income earners. Given the superannuation adjustment parameter, the e¤ective superannuation tax rates are lower than the statutory ones as the superannuation guarantee system is fully mature in our model, whereas it has yet to achieve full maturity in Australia. The e¤ective consumption tax rate (i.e., the product of the statutory GST rate of 10 percent and the consumption adjustment parameter) equals 14.5 percent, generating the tax revenue that includes not only the GST revenue but also receipts from other indirect taxes. In Australia, the payroll taxes are collected by state governments from businesses with payroll exceeding a certain threshold. The tax rate and the threshold di¤er across the states. The model assumes the payroll tax to be imposed on household's labour income at the statutory rate of 5.45 percent (i.e., the NSW payroll tax rate). We abstract from any threshold and so the e¤ective rate of 2.6 percent is to match the observed payroll tax revenue to GDP ratio.
The lifecycle pro…les for labour supply, labour earnings and age pension payments of three selected skill types -the lowest, third and highest income quintiles are depicted by Figure 3 . Both the labour supply and earnings pro…les for each income quintile exhibit the standard hump shapes, rising at early ages with increasing labour productivity and then declining. According to Figure 3c , the lowest quintile gets the full (or maximum) pension from age 65 onwards, while the third quintile receives a part age pension at early age pension ages and households in the highest quintile do not receive any pension until age 76 due to the means test. Importantly, the model-generated pro…les averaged across the …ve income groups are shown to approximate fairly well average cross-sectional data derived from the 2010 HILDA data set based on a survey of Australian households (Wooden et al., 2002 ). In $100,000
Age model-low est model-third model-highest model-average HILDA-average 10 As already discussed, our model abstracts from bequest motives, requiring households to completely exhaust their savings, if they survive until the assumed maximum age of 100 years. Hence, the model underestimates average asset holdings at older ages.
The benchmark solution for key macroeconomic ratios and household net income variables is presented in Table 3 , which also provides a comparison with Australian data taken from ABS (2012b, 2013c) and reported as averages over the …ve-year period of 2008-12. As shown, the distribution of net income and the Gini coe¢ cient measured in net income match closely the ABS (2013c) data. Similarly, the results for the components of aggregate demand reveal that the model replicates the Australian economy fairly well.
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Note that the positive trade balance generated by the model, which has been negative in Australia for some time, is due to the targeted negative foreign assets position and our assumption of dynamic e¢ ciency with the exogenous interest rate greater than the rate of population growth. 
Quantifying the e¤ects of demographic transition
We now use the model speci…ed in Section 2, …tted with demographic projections described below, to examine …scal costs of demographic transition. We …rst present key population statistics of the baseline demographic transition and then discuss the implications of this demographic transition for the main macroeconomic and …scal aggregates.
Demographic projections
The starting point of our population projections is the age structure of the Australian population (i.e., actual cohort sizes) in 2012. We then use the future fertility, survival and net immigration rates assumed in the Productivity Commission's (2013) medium population projection scenario (see Section 3 above for details) to generate the future cohort sizes and cohort shares in the total population over the next 100 years. 12 The key population statistics for this demographic transition path are provided in Table 4 ; which shows that by 2050 a) the total population increases to over 35 million, b) the old-age dependency ratio exceeds 37 percent, and c) the total dependency ratio (that includes the youth dependency ratio) increases above 65 percent. Furthermore, the proportion of 65+ year olds in the population will increase from 14 percent in 2012 to over 22 percent in 2050, demonstrating an ageing trend in Australia's population. This baseline demographic transition path with the changes in the cohort shares and sizes is used our economic model to simulate the implications for key macroeconomic aggregates and for the budgetary situation of the government. These aggregate e¤ects are driven to a large extent directly by the demographic changes (i.e., future changes in the age structure of the population brie ‡y described above), but also to some extent by behavioural responses of households to these demographic changes. Since it takes several hundred years to reach a new steady state in our model, we only focus on the e¤ects along the transition up to 2100.
The macroeconomic and …scal e¤ects that are presented below also assume that the government budget is balanced each year by adjustments in non-age related expenditures. The required cuts in these non-age related expenditures to …nance expected increases in age-related government spending will give us a measure of the total …scal cost or burden due entirely to the future changes in the population structure in Australia. 13 
Macroeconomic e¤ects
The simulation results of the baseline demographic transition for the key macroeconomic variables are provided in Table 5 . The e¤ects are reported as percentage changes in the selected per capita variables relative to their benchmark values in 2012.
Starting with the e¤ects on labour supply, our results show an initial increase in per capita labour of 3:04 percent by 2015, as the working population work longer hours to respond to unanticipated improvements in mortality rates and longevity. However, in the medium and long terms, direct demographic e¤ects with smaller shares of the working-age population cause per capita labour supply to decline of 7:51 percent by 2050 and 11:63 percent by 2100. The labour supply e¤ects are negatively correlated with the implications for the wage rate, which is somewhat higher for most of the transition path, due to capital deepening. Notice that the e¤ects on the wage rate are small in our open economy framework with the exogenous interest rate. The e¤ects on domestic total assets are signi…cantly positive. Table 5 also shows that domestic total assets are 35:4 percent higher in 2050 and almost 40 percent in 2100 relative to the base year of our calculations in 2012. Both the direct demographic e¤ects with an increasing proportion of the elderly holding large assets and indirect behavioural e¤ects with increased lifecycle savings are behind these aggregate increases in domestic assets. 14 In contrast, the domestic capital stock decreases over the transition (due predominantly to reduced per capita labour supply, which to large extent determines the implications for other production variables), implying that the increase in domestic assets is used to reduce net foreign debt. As found in related literature (Fehr et al., 2008) , we observe declining asset prices as the population ages. The e¤ects on average consumption are mostly positive, with per capita consumption increasing by 3:70 percent in 2050 relative to its 2012 value. However, the increases in per capita consumption (the largest expenditure on GDP) are not large enough to prevent the economy from contracting, with a GDP per capita decrease of 6:7 percent by 2050. The implications for national product or GNP, which includes interest payments on foreign debt, are positive compared to GDP because of large decreases in foreign debt. 15 Table 6 reports the …scal implications of the baseline demographic transition as percentage changes in government tax revenues and expenditures (all measured in per capita terms) relative to their benchmark values in 2012. The results for the government tax revenues show an increase of 2.16 percent in the total tax revenues by 2050. More interestingly, the projected demographic changes lead to a structural change in tax revenues, with a shift in the tax base from labour earnings to asset incomes and consumption. Hence, the tax revenue from payroll taxes declines signi…cantly, while the consumption tax revenue improves during the demographic transition.
Fiscal e¤ects
negative. The key di¤erence is the presence of distortive payroll taxes, which are high in these countries and need to be increased further to …nance growing old-age related government spending programs. Our model includes a payroll tax rate, which only collects 5 percent of the total tax revenues and is unchanged over the transition (as the other tax rates). 15 Our interest is in the e¤ects of population ageing on per capita variable. Note that all aggregate variables increase signi…cantly over the transition path due to high net immigration resulting in a growing total population. On the expenditure side of the government budget, old-age expenditures are shown to increase signi…cantly due to a growing proportion of older cohorts in the population, causing the overall age-related spending to increase by 40 percent (to over 22 percent of GDP) by 2050. In particular, our results (that only account for the e¤ects of the changes in demographic factors) indicate that the increases in health care, aged care and pension expenditures in 2050, relative to 2012, are 27:3; 111:85 and 47:6 percent, respectively.
We …nd signi…cant …scal costs due to population ageing, with the other (non-age related) government expenditure needing to decline by 31:7 percent by 2050 and by almost 60 percent by 2100 to close the …scal gap. As shown in Figure 4 depicting government expenditures expressed in percent of GDP, the other expenditures decrease by over 2 percentage points of GDP to 5.5 percent of GDP in 2050 and by additional 2 percentage points of GDP to 3.56 percent of GDP in 2100.
Quantifying the e¤ects of …scal reforms
We now relax the …scal rule in which the government adjusts the non-age related expenditure and examine other …scal adjustments to …nance some or all of the …scal cost of population ageing that we documented above for the baseline demographic scenario. The …scal policy reforms include (i) pension cuts, (ii) tax hikes and (iii) a mix of pension cuts and tax hikes. The objective is to study the consequences of these …scal reforms for the economy and welfare of households.
Fiscal reform 1: Pension cuts
We start with an experiment in which the government implements several changes in the age pension policy settings to cut pension bene…ts and thus to limit future growth in overall pension expenditures. Since cutting pension bene…ts is not su¢ cient to cover the increased …scal cost of all aged related expenditures, we adjust the non-age related expenditure to maintain a balanced government budget.
We consider the following policy changes: (i) a higher pension access age, (ii) a reduced maximum pension and (iii) an increased taper rate of the pension means test. It is further assumed that each of these policy changes representing a pension cut is implemented gradually in two steps, following the gradual increases in the age pension access age legislated in 2010. We closely match this legislation by increasing the age pension access age from 65 years to 66 years in 2018 (for cohorts aged between 59 and 56 years in 2012) and to 67 years in 2023 (for generations aged 55 years and younger in 2012). The second policy change assumes a 5 percent hypothetical cut in the maximum pension in 2018, with an additional 5 percent cut in 2023. The third policy change is implemented by raising the income taper from the current rate of 0.5 to 0.625 in 2018, with a further increase to 0.75 in 2023.
We …rst present and discuss the macroeconomic and welfare e¤ects of the aggregate pension cut, containing all three aforementioned changes in the current pension policy rules. We then report on the e¤ects of each of the components of the assumed aggregate pension cut.
Aggregate pension cut. The macroeconomic implications of all three pension policy changes (labeled as the aggregate pension cut) in Table 7 are reported as percentage changes in the main per capita variables relative to the e¤ects obtained from the baseline demographic transition. The displayed improvements in other (non-age related) expenditures give the reduction in the …scal gap (or costs). As a result of the aggregate pension cut, the non-age related expenditures increase 30 percent by 2050 and over 50 percent by 2100 relative to the baseline demographic e¤ects. However, notice that these budgetequilibrating expenditures are still signi…cantly lower along the demographic transition than they were in the base year of 2012. Furthermore, the reduced age pension expenditures (over 30 percent by 2050) contribute only a 6.35 percent decrease in overall age-related government expenditures. Hence, the cuts in age pension payments alone cannot fully eliminate the …scal costs of population ageing, driven to a large extent by projected increases in other old-age related public spending such as on health and aged care programs. The …scal gap narrows not only because of lower age-related government spending but also due to increased taxation revenues. It is well known that public pensions may reduce lifecycle labour supply and savings as they act as substitute for private income in retirement. The simulated pension cuts provide an incentive for households to work and save more over the lifecycle. Table 7 shows that the aggregate pension cut increases per capita labour supply and domestic total assets by 2050 of 1.19 percent and 5.71 percent, respectively. As households work longer hours and save more, their labour earnings and investment income increase, generating higher revenues from progressive income and payroll taxes.
The pension cuts have also positive e¤ects on GDP per capita, driven by higher labour supply. The e¤ects on per capita consumption, however, are negative and more signi…cant in the short run as consumption of some older households with reduced pension bene…ts declines.
The distributional (both inter-and intra-generational) welfare e¤ects of the aggregate pension cut are displayed in Figure 5 . The e¤ects are depicted for income quintiles and average welfare as a function of generation's age at the time of the pension reform announcement in 2012. 16 Following Auerbach and Kotliko¤ (1987, p.87), the calculation of welfare e¤ects is based on the concept of standard equivalent variation, which, for a particular generation, measures the proportional percentage change in consumption and leisure needed in the benchmark scenario (i.e., baseline demographic transition) to produce the remaining utility under the policy change (i.e., baseline demographic transition with the aggregate pension cut). The inter-generational e¤ects on average welfare across the income quintiles depicted 16 Recall that the oldest generations in our model are aged 100 years and the youngest adult generations are aged 21 years, with all younger generations than 21 years of age assumed to enter the economic model in the succeeding years of the demographic transition (i.e., future adult generations).
by the dotted line in Figure 4 indicate that older and middle age generations experience particularly large welfare losses. The losses for these generations are caused by the cuts in their future pension payments phased in after 2018, which have negative implications for their consumption. The e¤ects on average welfare of future adult generations (i.e., those aged 20 years and younger at the time of the reform announcement) are still negative, but the losses are signi…cantly smaller in comparison with those attained by older and middle age cohorts. Although these future generations face the same changes in the pension policy settings, they have the whole lifecycle to adjust their behaviour in terms of labour supply and savings to these policy changes. 17 The results across di¤erent skill types highlight that lower income types attain signi…-cantly greater welfare losses than higher income types. For these lower income households, the age pension represents by far the main source of retirement income and, in particular, the 10 percent reduction in the maximum pension and the higher pension access age policy lead to large decreases in their life cycle consumption. As shown in Figure 5 , there are two signi…cant reductions in welfare of the lowest and second quintiles aged 59 and 55 years at the time of the reform announcement. These are the …rst generations a¤ected by the higher pension ages of 66 and 67, respectively. As mentioned, future adult generations of all income types adjust their life cycle behaviour by accumulating large private savings to fund retirement consumption, thus, to a some extent, limiting the negative welfare e¤ects of pension cuts. The welfare losses for future generations of well-o¤ households are minimal (with the highest quintile in fact gaining in welfare in the longer term) as for them the age pension is not as important.
Components of aggregate pension cut. We have so far focused our discussion on the e¤ects of the aggregate pension cut. However, the extent to which each of the three components -higher pension access age, reduced maximum pension and increased taper rate -contributes to the results for the overall pension cut is unclear. Below we compare the macroeconomic and distributional welfare e¤ects of the three policy changes.
The macroeconomic results in Table 8 show positive e¤ects of all three pension changes on per capita labour supply, assets, output and overall taxation revenue, as well as reduced age pension expenditures, with an improved …scal position for the government depicted by higher non-age related expenditures. Although the e¤ects of the pension changes are qualitatively similar with the same direction of the impacts, the sizes of these e¤ects di¤ers to a some degree across the policy changes. The most e¤ective policy change in terms of the reduction in pension expenditures and …scal costs is the two step reduction in the maximum pension by 10 percent after 2023. This policy reduces age pension expenditures by 16 percent and increases other (budget-equilibrating) expenditures by 14.39 percent, which is more than double the increase reported for the higher access age reform in 2050. The main reason for this di¤erence is that the reduced maximum pension lowers pension bene…ts for all skill types, while the increased pension eligibility age a¤ects only the pensions paid to lower income households. Interestingly, the reduced maximum pension increases labour supply and reduces average consumption upon the policy announcement, whereas the other two pension policy changes have the most signi…cant e¤ects on these variables when they are actually implemented. The reduced maximum pension represents a pure negative income e¤ect, with per capita labour supply increasing and average consumption decreasing by 0.86 percent and 0.81 percent in 2015, respectively. In the succeeding years of the demographic transition, households accumulate larger assets, thus e¤ectively replacing public pensions with private income in retirement. The transitional growth in domestic assets allows for reductions in per capita labour supply and improvements in average consumption relative to the short run results. On the contrary, the announcement e¤ects of the other two pension policy changes are smaller for per capita labour supply compared with the two years (2018 and 2023) when the eligibility age and the income taper rate are actually increased.
The distributional welfare e¤ects of each of the three pension policy changes are depicted in Figure 6 . Starting with the gradual increases in the age pension eligibility age, Figure 6a shows than only the third income quintile and the two lower income types aged 59 years and younger at the time of the policy announcement have their welfare a¤ected. The welfare of all generations aged 60 years and over in 2012 is unchanged as their pensions are treated under the current pension rules with the access age at 65 years, while higher income households younger than 60 years do not qualify for any pension at early age pension ages because of the means testing. However, the welfare implications for lower income households are quite negative, with two signi…cant welfare reductions for lower income cohorts aged 59 and 55 years in 2012 -…rst generations of pensioners that must wait to receive a pension at 66 and 67, respectively, respectively. The reduced maximum pension policy has particularly negative e¤ects on welfare of lower income types approaching the current pension access age, with the largest loss of over 2 percent in remaining welfare experienced by the lowest income households. 18 Welfare of younger and future generations improves due to increased savings and self-funding in retirement, but only future generations of the highest skill type gain in welfare.
The policy change of strengthening the pension means test by lifting the income taper has no impact on welfare of lower income households, as demonstrated by Figure 6c . These households receive the full age pension regardless whether the taper rate is 0.5 (as in benchmark) or 0.75 (as under this reform). While the lowest income households are una¤ected by this policy change, most generations of the other income types attain lower welfare as the more binding income test lowers their pension bene…ts. Note that the largest welfare losses due to the increased taper rate for the third and fourth income quintiles are about half of the losses attained by the lowest income quintile under the higher access age and reduced maximum pension changes.
Fiscal reform 2: Tax hikes
We now turn our attention to tax hikes. To mitigate the …scal costs arising from the population ageing along the demographic transition, we consider policy changes in (i) the consumption tax rate, (ii) progressive income taxation (proportional changes in average/marginal income tax rates) and (iii) the payroll tax rate. Our approach is to assume that there is no change in the economy except for demographics and one tax rate that is adjusted in order to produce the same reduction in the …scal costs measured in terms of improvements in non-age related government expenditures as under the aggregate pension cut. 19 This allows us to compare not only the e¤ects among the three di¤erent tax hikes, but also their e¤ects with those discussed above for the aggregate pension cut.
Macroeconomic e¤ects. The macroeconomic implications of the three tax hikes are provided in Table 9 as percentage changes in the selected per capita variables relative to the e¤ects of the baseline demographic transition (included in Tables 5 and 6 ). As expected, all budget-equilibrating tax policy changes require higher taxes to reduce the …scal burden of population ageing. However, the size of increases in each tax rate varies signi…cantly, which is due partly to di¤erences in the amount of revenues collected by each tax and also because of di¤erent e¤ects of each tax increase on the underlying tax base. For example, the payroll tax rate needs an increase of almost 290 percent by 2015 (with the e¤ective rate increasing from 2.6 percent in 2012 to 7.45 percent by 2050) to generate the same reduction in …scal costs as the aggregate pension cut. The increases in the consumption tax rate and/or in the progressive income taxation (i.e., the average income tax rate) are much smaller in percentage terms as these tax rates are higher and the government collects signi…cantly larger revenues from the two tax sources. Interestingly, the percentage increases in the consumption tax rate required to balance the government budget with the improved non-government expenditures are smaller than the required increases in the average income tax rate. Although the income tax revenue is larger by almost 3 percentage points of GDP than the consumption tax revenue (as shown in Table  2 for 2012), the income tax rates are required to increase 26.69 percent by 2050, compared to a 21.75 percent increase in the consumption tax rate by that year. The reason is that the increases in progressive income taxation are more distortive for household behaviour than the consumption tax hike, negatively a¤ecting lifecycle labour supply and savings and thus reducing the income tax base. The consumption tax hike has quite distinct impacts on key macroeconomic variables compared to those produced by the progressive income and payroll tax hikes. Speci…cally, the consumption tax hike results in positive e¤ects on per capita labour supply, assets and output, while the required increases in progressive income or payroll taxes result, which to a large extent impact on middle-age working households, have negative e¤ects on the economy. Table 9 shows that using the progressive tax adjustment policy, average labour supply and domestic assets decreases of 1.82 percent and 7.62 percent by 2050, respectively. Even the decrease in consumption per capita in 2050 is more than a double of the consumption reduction under the consumption tax hike. This demonstrates a highly distortive nature of progressive income taxes for household behaviour. The payroll tax is collected at a ‡at rate from labour earnings of the working age population. The e¤ects on the macroeconomic aggregates are also negative during the transition, but not as large as under the progressive income tax hike. The changes in labour supply and assets also impact the age pension expenditures. For instance, the progressive tax hike increases pension expenditures because of the means testing of reduced private income (i.e., assets income and labour earnings) at older ages.
Welfare implications. The distributional welfare e¤ects of the investigated tax hikes are plotted in Figure 7 . As for the age pension policy changes, the welfare e¤ects of the tax changes are presented as percentage changes in the remaining utility for each income quintile of every generation relative to the remaining utility level under the baseline demographic transition. Several observations can be drawn from these results. First, the welfare losses of younger and future generations are much larger than the e¤ects on welfare of older generations. In the case of the payroll tax hike (with the payroll tax collected only from labour income of working households), the welfare of many older generations is not a¤ected at all. In contrast, recall the large welfare losses attained by retired generations and those approaching retirement that were displayed in Figure 5 for the aggregate pension cut. Second, although all examined tax hikes reduce welfare along the demographic transition, the size of the losses for future generations di¤ers greatly among the tax hikes. The least distortive consumption tax hike generates smaller average welfare losses for future generations compared to those attained by these generations under the income and payroll tax hikes.
Finally, taxing consumption or directly income through either progressive or payroll taxes have opposing intra-generational welfare implications. In particular, the direct income tax hike reduces the welfare of higher income households more than the welfare of lower income types. This is the case especially when the progressive income tax rates are increased to limit the …scal costs, with the largest welfare loss of over 3 percent experienced by the highest income quintile of future generations. In contrast, the consumption tax hike produces larger welfare losses for future generations of lower income households because of the regressive nature of the ‡at consumption tax rate. Further note that under the consumption tax hike, the di¤erences in the welfare e¤ects among the …ve income types are much smaller in comparison with the e¤ects resulting from the progressive income tax hike, with a 2.5 percentage point range between the minimum and maximum welfare losses for future generations.
Fiscal reform 3: Mix of pension cuts and tax hikes
In the …scal policy adjustments examined above, households are only partially responsible for the …scal costs of population ageing as the government is allowed to reduce its nonage related spending to balance its budget with either pension cuts or tax hikes. In this section, we consider experiments in which the government not only cuts the pension bene…ts (as in Reform 1), but also increase taxes to fully cover the …scal costs arising from the demographic shift. 20 More speci…cally, we implement the following two experiments:
(i) The aggregate pension cut and the consumption tax hike, and (ii) The aggregate pension cut and the payroll tax hike. 21 Macroeconomic e¤ects. Table 10 summarises the changes in macroeconomic variables between 2015 and 2100 under the two …scal reform scenarios, with population ageing and rising age-related public spending …nanced by the pension cuts and adjustments in either the consumption tax rate or the payroll tax rate. The tax rate reported in Table 10 is either the e¤ective consumption tax rate or the e¤ective payroll tax rate that maintains a balance government budget, which is also impacted by the aggregate pension cut. The tax rate initially declines, partly due to the demographics (with increased tax revenues and reduced expenditures on education and family bene…ts) but largely due to pension cuts (with reduced pension expenditures). 22 However, in the longer term, the e¤ective tax rate needs to increase to close the …scal gap, with the payroll tax rate in particular rising substantially to over 19 percent by 2100.
The initial decline in either the consumption or payroll tax rates has positive e¤ects on the economy, with per capita labour supply, assets and output increasing more that under the aggregate pension cut alone. For instance, the aggregate pension cut with the payroll tax adjustments increases per capita assets by 8.13 percent by 2030, compared to 4.3 percent increase displayed in Table 5 for the aggregate pension cut alone. As mentioned, pension cuts reduce retirement income provided by the government, which induces households to work and save more to replace lower pension bene…ts with higher private income in retirement. The income tax rate reductions provide further incentives to work and save. In contrast, the increases in the e¤ective payroll tax rate after 2030 negatively a¤ect the selected macroeconomic variables. As shown in Table 10 , per capita labour supply, assets and consumption fall by 2100 is 1.04 percent, 2.14 percent and 11.17 percent, respectively. Table 10 also demonstrates important di¤erences between the two tax adjustments, with increases in consumption or payroll tax rates after 2030 leading to opposing e¤ects on the economy in the long run. Note that an increase in the payroll tax directly reduces the e¤ective wage rate (i.e., the price of leisure), generating a substitution e¤ect and leading to lower labour supply. In contrast, an increase in the consumption tax leads to higher consumption expenditures, making households work more to meet these expenditures.
The opposing aggregate e¤ects imply trade-o¤s for policy selection based on macroeconomic aggregates. To have a better view of how the e¤ects of these two policy mixes map into the welfare e¤ects across households and generations, we consider a welfare analysis.
Welfare implications. The welfare e¤ects of the two combinations of pension cuts and tax hikes are depicted by Figure 8 . The top panel shows the e¤ects of the aggregate pension cut with adjustments in the consumption tax rate, while the bottom graph shows the e¤ects of pension cuts combined with adjustments in the payroll tax rate. As seen before, the welfare e¤ects presented in the …gure above are non-linear and vary across generations and income groups. As expected, the pattern of the welfare e¤ects shows a combination of the e¤ects reported for …scal reforms 1 and 2. The aggregate pension cut lowers the welfare of existing generations born prior to the reform (with particularly large losses to lower income groups), whereas tax hikes decrease the welfare of future generations.
A comparison of the two experiments with di¤erent tax adjustments reveals that the welfare losses for future generations across all income types are much larger when the payroll tax is adjusted. This indicates that taxing labor income to …nance the …scal costs of population ageing not only has a negative impact on the economy but also reduces the welfare of households. The economic mechanism is provided by the distortion that a speci…c labor income tax has on work incentives and labor supply. In a small open economy, the adverse labor supply e¤ect translates directly into lower demand for capital and output. In the context of population ageing, that adverse e¤ect is even more detrimental. This …nding indicates that the option of relying on labor income taxes to …nance the ageing cost is dominated by the option relying on consumption taxes. Sensitivity analysis. We also carry out some sensitivity checks for the simulations for the combination of the aggregate pension cut with the consumption or payroll tax hikes. We …rst consider a high ageing scenario based on low future fertility and net immigration rates and high future survival probabilities assumed by Productivity Commission (2013). The second modi…cation assumes imperfect capital mobility with an endogenous interest rate determined by the changes in level of foreign debt (as in Guest, 2006) .
The results for the two robustness checks are qualitatively similar to those presented above, with the direction of both macroeconomic and welfare changes unchanged. Quantitative di¤erences can be summarised as follows. The high ageing scenario in the short and medium terms allows for lower budget-equilibrating tax rates (either consumption or payroll tax rates). This is partly due to increased income tax revenues (as households response to increased life expectancy by working and saving more) and partly due to reduced spending on education and family bene…ts. However, in the longer term substantial increases in old age related government expenditures (arising from the increased proportion of the elderly in the total population) require further tax hikes, leading to larger welfare losses to future born generations. The results obtained from the imperfect capital mobility simulations are similar to those in a closed economy. We have shown that pension cuts leads to higher domestic assets and lower net foreign debt. As a result, the domestic interest rate in this amended framework declines, driving up the demand for investment and leading to a higher capital stock, with positive e¤ects on wages. The welfare implications of pension cuts and tax hikes are negative for old households (due to a lower return on their assets) but positive for future born generations (due to lower tax rates and higher wages) when compared to small open economy framework with the exogenous and constant interest rate.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyse the …scal cost caused by the ageing demographic shift in Australia, and study the e¤ects of structural …scal reforms to mitigate such …scal challenges. Our analysis is based on a computable dynamic general equilibrium, overlapping gen-erations model calibrated to match the demographic developments and macroeconomic data from Australia. We identify three …scal programs, including medical insurance, age pension and aged care programs, that are serious sources of …scal instability in Australia. We quantify the contribution of each program in the long-run and during the transition. We then quantify the macroeconomic and welfare implications of the two …scal reform options: pension cuts and tax hikes.
We …rst introduce an aggregate pension cut that consists of (i) legislated increases in pension access age, (ii) hypothetical reductions in the maximum pension and (iii) hypothetical increases in the taper of the pension means test. Our experiment results indicate that people receiving the pension and those approaching the pension access age experience signi…cant welfare losses, especially households in lower income groups. We then analyse the e¤ects of each component of the aggregate pension cut and …nd signi…cant di¤erences in the distributional welfare implications. The higher pension age and reduced maximum pension changes have negative welfare e¤ects on lower income households, whereas the increased taper rate policy has no impact on their welfare since they still qualify for the full age pension.
We compare the e¤ects of the aggregate pension cut to that of three options to increase taxes. We …nd that while the two policy options achieve the same …scal goal, the macroeconomic and welfare outcomes di¤er signi…cantly. Young and future generations prefer pension cuts to mitigate the …scal pressure because they are worse o¤ by having to pay higher taxes over their entire life cycle. Meanwhile, the current retiring and working generations prefer no pension cuts and increases in future taxes.
Our results suggest interesting outcomes when choosing between consumption and income tax policies. Taxing consumption or income results in opposing e¤ects on the economy and welfare across di¤erent income groups of households. Speci…cally, the required increases in consumption tax rate result in positive e¤ects on per capita labour supply, assets and output, but reduce the welfare of lowest income households most. Conversely, the increases in progressive income or payroll taxes result in negative e¤ects on output but reduce the welfare of poor households least.
Finally, we analyse the consequences of combining pension cuts with tax hikes to maintain a balances government budget. The results for these experiments indicate that a mix of pension cuts and labor income tax hike has some advantages by 2030. However, a mix of pension cuts and a consumption tax hike is the dominant policy option in the long run. Welfare losses to future generations from increased payroll taxes are more than double those resulting from consumption tax adjustments.
Our …ndings have important policy implications. Even though the costs of population ageing in the coming decades are inevitable, the transitional cost on aggregate economy and welfare can be minimized by the choice of …scal policy option and the timing of policy implementation. The reforms that allow individuals to have enough time to adjust and those that minimizes the …scal distortion on labor supply stand out as the best policy options. However, none of these policy reform options is likely to gain political support as each policy results in welfare losses for the current retiring and working generations. The con ‡ict of interests between current and future generations suggests political infeasibility for any structural …scal reforms.
Our results also suggest that a gradual shift from the retirement income support scheme that relies heavily on a means-tested pension system (e.g., an unfunded public pension scheme) towards a superannuation system (e.g., a self-…nanced private pension scheme) may e¤ectively help control …scal cost of demographic transition while allowing individuals to adjust labor supply and savings for retirement. How to design a meanstested pension system to exploit interactions between these two retirement systems is an interesting issue that needs further exploration. We leave this question for our future research. Kudrna and Woodland (2011) . In brief, the algorithm involves choosing initial values for some endogenous variables and then updating them by iterating between the production, household and government sectors until convergence. The same algorithm is used to compute the transition path, but the generations of heterogeneous households (i.e., …ve income or skill types) alive at the time the policy change is announced must be treated di¤erently from the steady state simulation. At the time of the policy announcement, existing generations solve their utility maximisation problems again but over shorter lifetimes given their assets accumulated prior to the policy announcement. As mentioned above, the initial distribution of assets for these generations is obtained from the arti…cial steady state simulation.
